The counteroffensive is important not only in connection with the liberation of a vast territory and the people living on it, but also from the point of view of the fact that:
1. Struggle for strategic military initiative. The Russian Federation advanced for six months and imposed on Ukraine the place and time of the battles. In conditions of mobile warfare, this is an additional difficulty for the defender - it is necessary to stretch his forces over the entire length of the front, while the attacker concentrates them at the right time on the right sector. Now it's the other way around. In addition to the Donetsk direction, the Armed Forces of Ukraine forced the Russian troops everywhere to go on the defensive. "SVO" failed, but the war continues.
2. A reputational blow to the Russian army (the power bloc as a whole) and the political leadership. A blow to the “strength” of the Russian authorities, which will increase friction between the radical patriotic part of society and the authorities, distrust and loss of part of the respect from the rest.
3. Derail the creation of "KhanR" by holding a referendum in a part of the Kharkiv region; reduce the low level of confidence and support for Russia in the remaining occupied territories;
4. Removes the threat of encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the Donbas and significantly reduces the likelihood of the Russian Federation seizing the entire territory of the Donetsk region this year;
5. Will lead to an increase in military and financial assistance to Ukraine against the backdrop of success and the formation of confidence in the possibility of victory over the Russian Federation; and encourages the Ukrainian Defense Forces and Western partners ahead of the difficult heating season.
But the war is not over, it can go on for years and the front line can still change several times. You have to be ready for this. Also, the main question now is: how will the leadership of the Russian Federation react and compensate for the defeats (punishment of the perpetrators and purges among the military, general mobilization, involvement of foreign partners in the war, nuclear threat?) And what reserves does the “Ukrainian coalition” still have compared to the Russian Federation.
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|About the Author:|
| RUSLAN BORTNIK|
Political scientist, candidate of political sciences
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