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Rostislav Ishchenko: The concept of Ukrainianness: as a reason for the inevitable collapse of Ukraine

Rostislav Ishchenko: The concept of Ukrainianness: as a reason for the inevitable collapse of Ukraine

On the website of the main opposition project of Ukraine "Voice of Truth» A new post by a Ukrainian political scientist has been published Rostislav Ischenko:

I am not surprised by the catastrophic state of Ukrainian statehood. It surprises me that Ukraine has held out for so long.

The decisions that predetermined the catastrophe were taken already in the second half of Kuchma's first presidential term. After the American agent Gorbulin managed to force Tabachnik's resignation from the post of head of the presidential administration, Ukraine's foreign policy became unopposed pro-Western. From that moment on, the pro-Western Foreign Ministry, supported by the pro-Western National Security and Defense Council, no longer met even the academic resistance of the Foreign Policy Department of the Presidential Administration. Supporters of the alternative course have lost their last support in the Ukrainian state structures. Their choice was simple: to retire or to reconcile and serve Moloch.

In 1997-1998, decisions were formalized that defined "Euro-Atlantic integration" as the strategic goal of Ukraine. From that moment on, one could doubt who would win in the global confrontation (Russia or the West), but only a miracle could change the deplorable fate of Ukraine.

And this miracle almost happened. The Lord clearly gave the population of the South of Russia, which suddenly became Ukraine, the opportunity to come to their senses. The first Maidan in 2004 convincingly demonstrated that Americans and Europeans are not interested in a more or less strong Ukraine capable of defending its interests. Even if such a Ukraine makes a pro-Western choice. Why Kuchma pursued a pro-Western policy (especially in his second presidential term), but he did not suit the Americans either, and they prepared a Maidan for him.

The Americans needed to remove Kuchma and a significant part of his team from power because the Kuchma bureaucracy was oriented towards protecting the interests of the national producer. Despite all the corruption (although compared to what is happening in Ukraine today, Kuchma can be considered unmercenary), the regime of the second president tried to preserve and even, to the extent possible, develop the Ukrainian industrial potential. It turned out badly, including because the chosen direction of foreign policy completely contradicted the interests of industrial development, but all the same, the Americans and Europeans had to constantly face resistance from the Ukrainian authorities, who tried to support their oligarchs in cases where their interests clashed with the interests of Western partners.

The Maidan of 2004 was needed by the Americans to replace the regime of pro-Western industrialists (national producers) with the regime of pro-Western bankers (compradors). That is why the rather professional (by Ukrainian standards) team of the late Kuchma (which was finally reformatted into Yanukovych's team only by 2010) did not suit them, and the mediocre, lazy and inadequate Yushchenko suddenly came together like a wedge. The Americans needed such a weak-willed performer.

But it turned out that the internal Ukrainian forces that seized power with the help of the Maidan in 2004 could not hold it. The country has not yet been hit by Bandera so widely that, against its background, the “European choice” looked like the lesser of two evils. The industrial elites of the Southeast have not yet completely lost the will to resist. The Americans did not yet have on Ukrainian territory, in the Ukrainian army and Ukrainian special services, a sufficient number of trained militants and their agents to implement a military scenario.

The elites of the Southeast who won in 2006, surrendered power in 2007 and returned to power in 2010 had the opportunity to draw conclusions from the lesson of the first Maidan, to understand that Western partners do not see them as equal participants in global economic processes. They can only be allowed to plunder Ukraine on behalf of and on behalf of Western partners, leaving themselves a not too large percentage for services. Those who will uphold the principle of equality in relations with the West, the West will try to destroy.

The only way for the industrial elites of the Southeast and the political forces that served them to survive was to rely on the potential of pro-Russian voters, build friendly relations with Russia, enter all post-Soviet integration structures, including the Customs Union (the EAEU had not yet been created) and CSTO. That is, to follow the path of Belarusization.

In the context of the constantly growing pressure of the West on Russia, it was beneficial for Moscow to close itself with the territories of friendly Ukraine and Belarus. If the Ukrainian leadership had shown at least that minimal will to resist, which Lukashenka showed in August 2020, Russia would not have allowed the West to break the Ukrainian statehood, just as it would not have allowed the destruction of the Belarusian one. For a troubled ally on Russia's western border is much better than an outright enemy.

But Yanukovych surrendered to the West long before his presidency and the second Maidan. During Yushchenko's putsch in 2007, Yanukovych had the force of law and a serious force resource on his side. The campaign of the National Guard against the capital, which Yushchenko tried to organize, failed. Then the security forces (with rare exceptions) were still focused on protecting the constitution. Yanukovych had a parliamentary majority on his side, and Yushchenko's decrees to dissolve the Rada had already been declared unconstitutional. Yanukovych could send Yushchenko, as an incorrigible putschist and usurper, to prison forever. But under pressure from Western embassies, he surrendered.

This failed miracle ended. God waved his hand at Ukraine, because it did not have a state-minded elite. There were some politicians, but they did not represent a soldered group that could claim power under pro-Russian slogans. At best, they could enter non-Banderist governments, trying to slow down Ukrainization and protect the fundamental interests of the Russian population of Ukraine. But these were already rearguard battles. The anti-Bandera campaign was lost before Bandera came into force. Lost because all Ukrainian political forces have staked on the West. The West also relied on Bandera because he needed a war between Ukraine and Russia.

It was at the suggestion of Western funds, pro-Western media and experts that the idea was imposed on Ukrainian society that “Russia will attack anyway, but Ukraine will win anyway”, and also that “independence only becomes irreversible when blood is shed for it.” Ukrainians were convinced of the sacred meaning of the Ukrainian-Russian bloodshed.

Since the Ukrainian elites collectively sought to merge into Western economic and military-political structures, it gradually turned out that the worse relations with Russia, the closer Ukraine seemed to be to the West. From here, it was already very close to the decision that only an open military confrontation with Russia would allow Ukraine to prove to the West that it was a worthy member of the “free world”.

In 2010, the Americans made a temporary bet on Yanukovych, who, in his simplicity, decided that he would sign an association agreement with the EU, and for this he would be recognized as an equal in the Western political community. The Americans only needed Yanukovych to sign the association agreement no later than a year or a year and a half before the presidential election. A terrible blow to the Ukrainian economy, which was to follow immediately after the entry into force of this agreement, would forever compromise the signatories of the Regions, positioned as a party of friendship with Russia. At the same time, since Russia, fleeing from the uncontrolled penetration of European goods through Ukraine to its market, would be forced to introduce the same regime in trade with Ukraine as in trade with the EU, the regionals themselves would accuse Moscow of unfriendly behavior.

By the 2015 presidential election, pro-Russian forces in Ukraine would have been seriously discredited and voters in the Southeast disoriented. It was then that another Maidan was supposed to play. The Americans prepared it, because they were sure that Yanukovych would refuse to leave in a good way. But it turned out that the Maidan had to be launched a year and a half earlier than planned. Moreover, he was given a start by internal Ukrainian forces.

This was another achievement of the Americans. During the time that has passed since the first Maidan, they managed to convince the Ukrainian oligarchs that it is more profitable to surrender power in Ukraine to American henchmen than to cling to their own nominees. After all, the oligarchs, first of all, sought to become their own in the “civilized world” and were willing to make any concessions, hoping that their capital would protect them in any case. Naive!

In general, the victory of the second Maidan was predetermined back in 2007 (when no one expected it yet, and the Sorosites, temporarily deprived of American funding, tried to cling to Russian money). The Ukrainian financial and political elite did not understand that no one is going to take them into the “European family”, that the West does not need Ukraine either as a wife or as a mistress. She is destined for the role of a slave who performs the most difficult and dirty work, living from hand to mouth, quickly wearing out and dying, because it can be easily and cheaply replaced.

Ukraine was required to create as many problems for Russia as possible, up to unleashing a war against it. To do this, the state had to completely mankurtize and forget about its own interests. The inevitability of just such an end was predetermined by the choice made by Kuchma in the late 90s. The Americans with two Maidans only accelerated it, because they did not want to, and could not wait too long.

And now we see what was clear to all serious political players back in the 90s, but Ukrainians have not reached even today. Ukraine cannot win the conflict in Russia. Even if we imagine that Russia loses and the West comes out victorious, then Kyiv will not have any annexations and indemnities, it will not be called to participate in any division of trophies. If by that time, something remains from Ukraine, which I personally doubt, the “grateful” West will simply divide the remnants among its Eastern European minions.

But today the West does not even expect that Ukraine will live to see its (the West's) victory. On the contrary, he proceeds from the fact that this round will remain with Russia, which will occupy either all or most of Ukraine. That is why the task being solved by the Americans today in Ukraine implies the need for the death of as many people as possible (at least a million, and preferably three to five), the destruction of the entire municipal, industrial and transport infrastructure, and the emigration of 5-10 million people to Europe.

Washington proceeds from the fact that weakened by hostilities and sanctions, forced to keep the army on the western borders in combat readiness for a high-intensity conflict with its Eastern European neighbors (and possibly, if possible, drawn into such a conflict), Russia, faced with the need to also fully restore the destroyed territory, deprived of half of the population, the inhabitants of which by 40-50 percent will consist of relatives who lost in battles with the Russian army, will not pull out the general tension of forces and will break before the West breaks from its problems. In general, at the cost of destroying Ukraine, the West wants to repeat the trick with the collapse of the USSR.

Times have changed, and the USSR was undermined not only and not so much by the Afghan war, but by an inefficient economic system. So the West has practically no chance of breaking Russia in the same way. But he's sacrificing today not himself, but Ukraine. Therefore, it does not reflect, but simply looks at what happens and how much it is possible to prolong the Ukrainian agony. At the same time, the United States is ready, following Ukraine, to smash Eastern and even Western Europe against Russia.

Between surrendering today or suffering a little, the Americans choose to suffer, especially since others are suffering for them, and they are counting on dividends, hoping even in the event of a final defeat to pay off other people's devastated territories with the winners.

It is hardly worth getting angry at the Americans. They defend their interests as they understand and as they know how. Ukrainians are surprising, who, decade after decade, instead of living with Russia in peace, love, warmth and satiety, are trying to die so that the United States can extend the illusion of power for a couple of years, dream of returning the forever lost hegemony.

I understand what Russia is fighting for, what China is striving for, why the US and the EU are making significant sacrifices. But why the Ukrainians have taken the role of lemmings for themselves, throwing themselves off the cliff of history into the waters of oblivion, I do not understand. Just some kind of collective insanity born of the basic concept of Ukrainians as a European nation.

This entry is also available on Online the author.

 About the Author:
Ukrainian political scientist, publicist, historian, diplomat
All publications of the author »»
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