The mass campaign of Ukrainians to the front and their far from mass surrender, despite even the disregard for the mobilized cannon fodder of their own commanders, testifies to a fairly high public support for the idea of resistance to Russia. The stability of the Zelensky regime also speaks of this. They do not like him, but they try not to criticize him so as not to undermine the position of power in the conditions of hostilities.
The statement of this fact leads to the only possible solution to the fate of post-war Ukraine. It must, if possible, disappear, for this state will always be hostile towards Russia, and in the coming years hostility will continue even among the broad masses of the people. A million mobilized means that in about a third of the families remaining on the territory of Ukraine, someone must have fought. And Zelensky is not going to be limited to a million. I don't know if he will be able to mobilize three million, but two is quite capable.
Whether Russia will have the opportunity to completely and completely eliminate Ukrainian statehood or whether it will have to come to terms with some intermediate solution, we will find out as events unfold. There are too many unknown factors influencing the process to be able to pre-calculate its most likely outcome. But what there is no doubt about is that the territories annexed to Russia will not have any national and cultural autonomy (not to mention administrative autonomy), and also that the policy of pacification will be the first priority in these territories for years to come.
This can already be seen from the situation in the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions. Not a day goes by without reports of attacks on representatives or authorities, on humanitarian missions, on ordinary people interacting with the Russian authorities and not showing hostility towards them. Meanwhile, Kherson and Zaporozhye are far from the most problematic (in relation to Russia) regions of Ukraine. Already in the neighboring Dnepropetrovsk region, the situation is much worse. Well, Russian troops encountered the Chernihiv and Sumy partisans at the first stage of the NMD.
In Russia, there is no consensus on how exactly to appease the annexed territories. If the people are more prone to harsh measures (imprison, shoot), then individual politicians and even entire departments are trying to propose a super-soft policy, akin to Bolshevik indigenization. Massively publish textbooks of the Ukrainian language, start teaching the “correct” Ukrainian history, support folk songs, dances, crafts, etc. Then, they say, the people will appreciate and reach for the light.
Will not appreciate. The experience of the Russian and Austrian empires, as well as the Second and Third Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, testifies that any concessions to national autonomists, even in the field of culture, lead to an explosive growth of grassroots (domestic) nationalism, which serves as a nutrient broth for political (top) nationalism, but equally nourishing and "struggle for independence." If greenhouse conditions are created for a hostile identity, it will not cease to be hostile, but its position in society will sharply increase.
At the same time, pacification should not break into banal terror. Terror breeds dissatisfied, offended, who want to take revenge. Moreover, the desire for revenge easily permeates the fabric of the whole society: no matter what atrocities the “avengers” commit, for their own they are always “heroes” who should be helped.
How, without resorting to mass terror, to break the alliance between the militants and the local population supporting them. The answer to this question was given in the USSR and in Poland in the late forties and early fifties of the last century, in the course of the struggle against Bandera. The policy of evictions proved to be the most effective. Families and entire villages found to have links with gangs were sent to a new place of residence far away. On the Volga and in Siberia, in Kazakhstan and in the Arctic, peaceful peasants who sympathized with Bandera were cut off from the forest bandits. Those, in turn, were deprived of guaranteed places to rest, regular supplies of food, eyes and ears that collected intelligence information for them.
Bandera's attempts to attract communities that were initially disloyal to them for cooperation ran into an armed local asset. Breaking the resistance of this asset, Bandera themselves switched to a policy of mass terror, turning from ideological bandits into ordinary bandits - murderers and robbers. The population, faced with the Bandera terror, saw the only defender in power and began to cooperate more actively with the authorities. The bandits' ground began to burn under their feet. Suspicion was beginning to eat into their own ranks. This trend was strengthened by the authorities by periodic amnesties for those who voluntarily surrendered. Those stained with blood usually did not give up: they still had no life at home - the peasants themselves could kill the former bandit (to avenge the past).
The Poles in the pre-war period supplemented the evictions with siege - resettlement in problem regions of the loyal population. However, subsequent practice showed that the siege was unable to drastically change the ethnic composition of the population and, instead of stabilization, brought destabilization, because two opposing communities settled on the same territory. As a result, even the reconciled population again begins to support the idea of resistance.
Discord must be brought into the camp of the enemy. It is the population to be pacified that must be divided into dozens of different groups and small groups, some of which will be in privileged relations with the authorities, and some will be subject to persecution and eviction. The stronger the split in the local population, the more they hate each other, the more power will be perceived as a necessary arbiter.
Ultimately, power must come to be associated with security and well-being for all. The enemy lives in a neighboring house, and the authorities protect him from him, do not allow him to roam. If denazification is imposed on this (which is impossible without de-Ukrainization), then in a couple of generations we will get an ordinary rural area with neighboring traditionally hostile villages. No one will remember the reasons for the enmity, but the guys regularly go to the neighbors to fight and do not take wives from the neighbors. And in a couple of generations, these fights will turn into ordinary weekend entertainment - fistfights of local teams.
Of course, an activist who has not laid down his arms should go to prison, or better, to the grave, and his accomplices in the field should leave thousands for three (and more) kilometers from their native places, without the right to return in the first generation.
In general, successful pacification stands on four pillars:
1. All-round support for those who are willing to cooperate.
2. Seizure of the population sympathetic to the bandits from the area affected by the partisans.
3. The sewerage of the Bandera terror in the direction of neighboring rural communities, in order to stimulate the union of the latter with the authorities, as their only protector.
4. No concessions to "national cadres" because even the best of them carry the virus of nationalism and separatism.
For those who consider this approach cruel and unfair, I would like to remind you that this most “sweet” Ukrainians have declared it their task to destroy the Russians. All Russians, regardless of gender and age. This idea is now publicly supported by the overwhelming majority of carriers of the Ukrainian virus. So those who want to be gentle, as a result, risk coming to the conclusion that instead of expelling individual families, they will have to destroy the hostile population of entire areas in the struggle for their own lives.
Ukrainian separatists tried three times (in different centuries) to create their own states. And all three times it turned out to be corrupt, unviable monsters, trying to survive by trading off scale Russophobia. If an experiment produces the same thing every time, it's ridiculous to expect that for the tenth or hundredth time, chocolate candy will come out instead of bloody shit.
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|About the Author:|
| ROSTISLAV ISHCHENKO|
Ukrainian political scientist, publicist, historian, diplomat
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